Talk:Hirohito

Naming convention

This article should open with "Emperor Showa," and then the name he's better-known by among English speakers, in line with his native cultural practice. GOLDIEM J (talk) 19:43, 7 August 2023 (UTC)

i was just about to put a comment saying the same thing, I honestly agree Camillz (talk) 13:57, 5 July 2024 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 17 September 2023

In the section "Foreign honours", "Foreign Member of the Royal Society (ForMemRS)" needs changing to "Fellow the Royal Society (FRS)". Hirohito was elected as a Royal Fellow under Statute 12 of the Society in 1971. He was never a Foreign Member. See https://catalogues.royalsociety.org/CalmView/Record.aspx?src=CalmView.Persons&id=NA2021&pos=1 and https://catalogues.royalsociety.org/CalmView/Record.aspx?src=CalmView.Catalog&id=EC%2f1971%2f37. 88.106.154.89 (talk) 19:43, 17 September 2023 (UTC)

 Done Pinchme123 (talk) 03:39, 5 October 2023 (UTC)

Legacy section does not actually discuss his legacy.

The legacy section only informs the read about what honours he received and when, and nothing about what his legacy actually is, and the "see also" section only leads to the "Japanese Nationalism" article. 92.236.211.53 (talk) 19:22, 19 December 2023 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 28/1/2024

Request to change his infobox name to his posthumous name (Emperor Showa), the same as his predecessors. 2400:4050:8841:EE00:C9BB:8BD4:1028:7A91 (talk) 08:42, 28 January 2024 (UTC)

 Not done Please take a look at the assorted discussions, both above and linked above to archives, about the use of his name. Besides that, the posthumous name is given in the infobox, it's simply that the infobox uses the most common name for this man as its title. Happy days, ~ Lindsay^Hello 09:26, 28 January 2024 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 24 March 2024

Legacy and Honors section:

On 31 October 1975, a press conference was held immediately after returning to the United States after visiting Japan.[142][143]

Correct to say her returned to Japan after visiting US. (I think it is a simple error where the countries were swapped.) Sbken (talk) 22:05, 24 March 2024 (UTC)

 Done.--Ulises Laertíada (talk) 18:25, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

what do you think about him

what do you think about him 2601:704:501:BB80:2947:5DCA:A408:8164 (talk) 23:11, 25 March 2024 (UTC)

Not the right place for such questions. See WP:NOTFORUM. Keivan.f^Talk 21:38, 26 March 2024 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 26 March 2024

I suggest that in the first section, fourth paragraph, the phrase "the Emperor formally renounced his divinity" be linked to the article regarding that event (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanity_Declaration) Devmo (talk) 06:00, 26 March 2024 (UTC)

Done. DrKay (talk) 17:48, 26 March 2024 (UTC)

Addition of a year

As the article is semi-protected, I cannot edit it myself and would therefore ask someone who can to add the year 1941 to the sentence which currently reads "On 5 September, Prime Minister Konoe informally submitted a draft of the decision to Hirohito". The last year mentioned before this is 1940, and then this sentence is followed by several paragraphs containing seven more dates without a year. These seven dates also belong to 1941, but are not recognisable as such because the year 1941 is stated nowhere before. 89.12.2.139 (talk) 15:00, 10 May 2024 (UTC)

Usage of Bix.

I see that Herbert Bix's book is cited throughout the article in numerous places, and this gives me a small amount of concern. For instance, this review of the book does state He also makes controversial statements about Hirohito without providing any evidence at all, and significant stretches of his narrative are highly questionable. His portrayal of Hirohito as wanting war with China in 1937 and 1938 is just one example. and Bix exaggerates Hirohito's importance. His own narrative account is at odds with his emphasis on Hirohito as the key decision maker because it shows the great extent to which the emperor was constrained:... In this context, Hirohito was far less a free agent than Bix implies, and while he was scarcely a puppet, he was not the puppet master that Bix makes him out to be. [1] as well as this review that notes Other historians, examining more or less the same material, reached different conclusions. Stephen S. Large, in his Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan (Routledge. 1992), found that the emperor was involved in the war as an informed observer and as a sanctioner of military plans, but he never initiated, decided, or dictated policy. Hata Ikuhiko, in his Showa tennō itsutsu no ketsudan (Bungei Shunjü, 1994), claimed that during the years 1937-45 Hirohito made only one important decision, that of ending the war. Peter Wetzler, in his recent book Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan (University of Hawai'i Press, 1998), pointed out that in accordance with the political tradition of Japan, the emperor was only one of several participants in the decision-making process. Therefore he had to be consulted but could not dictate to others. Wetzler dismisses the theory that Hirohito was a frustrated peace lover, but he rejects Bix's claim (as presented in the 1992 article) that the emperor led Japan in war. On the basis of the wartime records, he concludes that Hirohito was well informed on military planning, was often consulted, occasionally made suggestions, but at no time did he determine strategy in the manner of a Western commander in chief. [2]

The fact that Bix was demonstrably contested and seen in reviews as something of a fringe/minority viewpoint, isn't it a bit WP:UNDUE to have Bix represented without including the sources that disagree with Bix's interpretation per WP:WEIGHT? For instance, Historians such as Herbert Bix, Akira Fujiwara, Peter Wetzler in a paragraph that ends with American historian Herbert P. Bix said that Emperor Hirohito might have been the prime mover behind most of Japan's military aggression during the Shōwa era. makes it appear like Wetzler and Bix are in total agreement when Wetzler has, as demonstrated in the review above, rejected Bix's claims. Brocade River Poems (She/They) 03:32, 26 October 2024 (UTC)

Bix's book on Hirohito won a Pulitzer Prize and received considerable acclaim from other historians. [3][4] the reviews have said that Bix challenged the theory that Hirohito was a passive figure manipulated by those around him. Both reviews noted that the book is well-researched and backed by an impressive body of evidence supporting his claims. Given this information, his view is not a fringe one and should not be dismissed. I believe his statements should be organized into one pargraph and attributed appropriately.

The sentence, "Historians such as Herbert Bix, Akira Fujiwara, Peter Wetzler in a paragraph that ends with American historian Herbert P. Bix said that Emperor Hirohito might have been the prime mover behind most of Japan's military aggression during the Shōwa era." should probably be reworded to reflect the information provided by Stephen S. Large.

The entry i made below titled "Response to edit" is also relevant to this discussion. LilAhok (talk) 06:17, 26 October 2024 (UTC)

Yes, it won a Pulitzer Prize, and that's all well and good. However, that doesn't change the fact that the reviews I noted state several issues with the book and with some of Bix's claims that seem to be firmly in a minority opinion even among historians who do believe Hirohito was culpable. The reviews I posted above specifically note that Bix makes controversial claims and that a number of historians disagree with the extent to which Bix represents Hirohito's direct control over the affairs of the war. Currently, however, the article pairs together at least one of those historians with Bix and gives the impression that Wetzler supports the concluding statement that Emperor Hirohito might have been the prime mover behind most of Japan's military aggression during the Shōwa era, which doesn't mesh with the fact that Peter Wetzler rejected Bix's notion that Hirohito was so heavily involved. In his book Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan Peter Wetzler writes it is equally tenuous to make him into a “Fighting Generalissimo” and assert, as the historian Herbert Bix does, that “it was the emperor, more than anyone else, who delayed Japan’s surrender" (p.180). Brocade River Poems (She/They) 11:52, 26 October 2024 (UTC)

I really don't think that the fact that this article cites Professor Bix's book on many occasions should be a cause for concern (even if only a small one) for anyone. In addition to the two positive reviews cited by LilAhok, the value of this book is recognized by other experts, such as Kenneth J. Ruoff, Director of the Center for Japanese Studies at Portland State University, who writes in his books The People’s Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995 (2001, p.127) and Japan's Imperial House in the Postwar Era. 1945-2019 (2020, p. 136) that "If 'war responsibility' means participating in the policymaking process that led to the commencement and prosecution of an aggressive war (for many Japanese, the key issue was the responsibility for defeat, not complicity in an aggressive war), then there is growing evidence that Emperor Hirohito played a considerable role in this area.Thanks to Herbert Bix's biography of Hirohito, much of this evidence is now available to the English-language reader."

Of course, no one (not even Bix, of course) gets to have the final word on the unresolved debate about the extent of Hirohito's personal involvement in the war, and of course there are many authors who do not believe that he went so far as to be considered the mastermind of the war, beyond being an active participant in it. But that does not disqualify the book as a reliable source for many aspects of the article, as clearly demonstrated by the position of Professor Forrest E. Morgan, who, starting from a generally critical point of view towards Bix's opinion, recognizes the merit of his work insofar as "Bix rightly dispels the emperor’s popular image as a helpless, symbolic leader, who was a virtual puppet of Imperial Japan’s military oligarchs and unaware of how his government was prosecuting the war. Drawing from previously unexamined documents, he ably demonstrates that the emperor was fully aware of Japan’s political behavior and intimately involved in military planning even at the operational level. Based on Bix’s evidence, it is clear that the emperor was an active participant in Japan’s decision making process; however, Bix overstates that evidence when he protrays Hirohito as the driving force behind those decisions. Japanese decision making was a corporate process, versus the dominant-leader model that Bix depiction implies. Hirohito was not powerless, but he was not omnipotent either. Hirohito was a nationalist with expansionist ambitions, as was nearly every other political actor in Japan’s imperial government…”

Finally, the paragraph that is flagged as potentially confusing actually states what is attributed to Hara and Wetzler on the one hand, and what is attributed to Bix on the other. However, if the separation is not clear enough, Wetzler's opinion on the extent of Hirohito's role can be added after that of Bix without any problem.Ulises Laertíada (talk) 21:11, 26 October 2024 (UTC)

My issue wasn't that Bix is an unreliable source, my issue was that there is demonstrable contention about some of Bix's main claims and that there are WP:WEIGHT concerns with how Bix is currently being used.

I will note that a book in 2020 stating Thanks to Herbert Bix's biography of Hirohito, much of this evidence is now available to the English-language reader is all well and good but the review I referred to above states with so much at stake in debating Hirohito's role, at crucial points in his argument Bix should have identified the specific primary sources used by his secondary "authorities"; he does this sometimes, to be sure, but not consistently. He also makes controversial statements about Hirohito without providing any evidence at all, and significant stretches of his narrative are highly questionable. (p.109), and it isn't the only review that points to problems with Bix's scholarship.

As for the positioning of Wetzler, the juxtaposition of placing Wetzler and Bix together in the introductory paragraph and then having Bix's statement as the conclusion makes it appear as if Wetzler and Bix are in the same camp. The statement which is attributed to Wetlzer and other historians in the paragraph produced evidence suggesting that the Emperor worked through intermediaries to exercise a great deal of control over the military and was neither bellicose nor a pacifist but an opportunist who governed in a pluralistic decision-making process does not indicate any disagreement with Bix's statement at the end of the paragraph, even though Wetzler in the book cited specifically rejects Bix's claim. The statement that the Emperor worked through intermediaries to exercise a great deal of control over the military is completely at odds with Wetzler's understanding of Hirohito's role in the war, where Wetzler writes No single person made decisions in prewar Japan. Informal groups of high officials participated in discussions that would lead to a consensus of opinion about an issue, and this constituted a “decision.” On specific occasions some people had more influence than others. But all were equally responsible, and without responsibility, including the emperor...Deciding and enforcing policy in the manner of a Western commander in chief was not the emperor’s role in Japan...As these and other records show, the emperor was thoroughly informed of military matters. And comensurate with his position and Japanese methods of forming policies, he participated in making political and military decisions as the constitutional emperor of Imperial Japan and head of the imperial house (p.32). The statement that the Emperor worked through intermediaries to exercise a great deal of control over the military seems fairly at odds with Wetzler's statement.

Given the amount of reviews that have problem with Bix's claims, I think it's perfectly reasonble to be at least a little concerned about how Bix is used. Such as the below reviews:

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There is another review of the book which reads This portrait of Hirohito is skillfully set within the framework of 20th-century Japan, so the book also serves as a history of Japan in the era of the emperor. Unfortunately, Bix's own evidence shows that his central thesis is wrong: weak-willed, irresolute, and strategically nearsighted, the emperor acquiesced to the militarists at court and in the army and navy, but it is far-fetched to see him as their leader. In his revisionist zeal, Bix ruins his case as prosecutor by pressing it beyond the limits of the evidence. For academic and larger public libraries. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (Book Review). By: Levine, Steven I., Library Journal, 03630277, 11/1/2000, Vol. 125, Issue 18 Another review This book by Bix suffers from questionable scholarship. There is no bibliography. Many of the extensive footnotes are given in romanized Japanese, rendering them useless to anyone who doesn't read Japanese. Factual errors are sprinkled through the text. To cite but one, he says Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was "designated to lead the attack" on Pearl Harbor; the admiral was in Japan when the surprise raid was launched. Some of the author's historical judgments are also dubious. He underplays the role of Admiral Yamamoto, who sought to prevent the war but was overruled, mainly by army generals, and whose death at the hands of the Americans stunned Japan. Bix slights the motives of Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, who hated the United States because he had been badly treated while living in America as a boy... Bix acknowledges that many of his conclusions lack documentary evidence-e.g., Hirohito "left behind no abundance of texts with his signature on them." His text is peppered with phrases such as "little is known "difficult to assess," and "cannot be proven." [5] This review states at the end In other words, despite all that has been argued in this book, the author acknowledges that the modern emperors of Japan were manipulated by the political and military leaders of their time. So, unexpectedly, we are back to the good old theory which may not be wrong after all. [6]}}

Brocade River Poems (She/They) 00:10, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

The issue is not whether Bix is a reliable source for purposes of inclusion in the article. It is whether there are enough sources to provide a balanced view of Hirohito's involvement in Japanese war crimes. While the "Accountability for Japanese war crimes" section does mention upfront that "[t]he issue of Emperor Hirohito's war responsibility is contested", it devotes little (if any) attention to scholarly arguments challenging the notion that he held the same level of influence over his country's actions as Hitler or Mussolini. Instead, the section broadly paints such arguments as short-sighted at best and deceptive at worst without giving readers the opportunity to examine them themselves. In order to satisfy the minimum requirements of WP:WEIGHT, scholarly opinions contesting whether for Hirohito bore primary culpability for Japan's wartime actions should be given at least some attention.

For reference, here is a list of excerpts from works that contest the depiction of Hirohito as the mastermind behind Japanese policy during World War II.Emiya1980 (talk) 01:36, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

•"The Japanese system shared many affinities with the regimes of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. But there were also significant differences. Here, no possibility of arbitrary decision-making fell to any individual. I n fact, of the six systems examined, this was in many respects the most overtly collective form of government. The Emperor was more than a figurehead, but had no dictatorial, or genuinely regal, powers to force decisions upon his country. Nor did he attempt to do so. Rather, he backed — sometimes, hesitantly, even fearfully — the decisions of his government. Imperial majesty was only upheld by posing as the last resort of regime consensus, not by risking confrontation with his government, even less with his military. The Achilles heel of the system was, in fact, the position of the military. Constitutionally subject only to the Emperor, not the civilian government, the armed forces enjoyed a high degree of autonomy to shape national policy. Ministers falling faoul of the military were soon ousted — or assassinated. The Prime Minister, therefore, had to act largely at the behest of the dominant forces in the army and navy. These, in turn, in a peculiarity of the Japanese system, were heavily influenced by the views percolating upwards from factions based in the middle echelons of the officer corps."

•"[There is a]...theory [which] holds that the emperor Hirohito played an active, indeed a key role in preparing and planning for Japan's aggression in China against the Western powers, even taking a personal interest in germ warfare experimentation. Actually, there is something to this, but not as much as has been averred. The nineteenth-century Meiji Constitution did not create a constitutional monarchy in JApan, with a figurehead sovereign. Behind a facade of parliamentary rule, Japan was essentially an authoritarian monarchy, much as Imperial Germany or Tsarist Russia had been before World War I. The emperor retained enormous power, although he usually refrained from exercising it. ¶ This is where Hirohito's responsibility for the war lay. Not only did he fail to oppose the imposition of a militaristic regime on Japan during the early 1930s, he raised no objections to the militarists' adventurism in China. And when the armed forces asked him for a declaration of war against the Western powers, he did not hesitate to grant it. It is worth recalling in this regard that when, in mid-August of 1945, —in the aftermath of Hiroshima, the Russian invasion of Manchuria, and Nagasaki — the emperor ordered Japan to surrender, the country and its armed forces did so quickly and efficiently, despite the efforts of some militaristic fanatics to prevent it from ending. So at most, Hirohito's responsibility for the war was a sin of omission, rather than one of commission. That said, it well to remember that for most of Japan's history, the emperor was kept around as a sort of pet by the military strongmen who actually ran the country. For the emperor to go against the generals was to risk all the power he had."

•"[Emperor Hirohito's] reign was at first characterized by a strong pro-Western stance and [he] endorsed the parliamentary system which in practice restricted his own extensive prerogatives as Japan's supreme sovereign. The political system allowed Hirohito very limited room for initiative and when the military came to dominate politics in the 1930s, Hirohito was usually asked to endorse policies already approved by the army and the navy. He was personally opposed to the war with China and the declaration of war on the United States, but was presented in both cases with a fait accompli which he could not easily reverse. He was nevertheless unwilling for Japan to abandon its empire or to accept dishonour and as a result was a reluctant partner in the military imperialism of his cabinets."

•"Charismatic leadership was a defining characteristic of European fascism. Unlike Germany after the First World War, however, Japan retained its monarchy, embodied in Emperors Yoshihito and Hirohito. Ultimate political authority in Japan rested in theory if not in fact— in a dynastic ruler who claimed to be descended from a goddess. For many of the ruling elite, the kokutai—the concept of national polity, based on the perceived cultural and political legitimacy of the Emperor — was the essence of Japanese politics. The cultural underpinnings of Hitler's public leadership were demonstrably different from Hirohito, whom the Japanese public never saw and whose voice was not heard until he announced Japan's surrender over the radio in 1945. In Japan, there was also no equivalent to the position of the Führer or Il Duce. Day-to-day decision-making authority was not centred in the power of one individual but in the collective decisions of the Japanese cabinet, the military, and bureaucracy. There were fifteen Japanese Prime Ministers during the Sino-Japanese War, and none came close to accumulating the power and authority of Hitler. Even one of the more powerful Japanese Prime Ministers of the period, the militarist general Tojo Hideki, was constrained by existing constitutional practices, especially the 'independent supreme command.' "

•"Prewar photographs of Emperor Hirohito (1901-89) were almost invariably formal — he was usually in uniform, often astride a white stallion. Photographers were not allowed within 45 m (50 yds). A genuine liberal, he was often blamed for not acting to stop Japan's mad rush to war. Though theoretically supreme, he had, in practice, limited powers. He appointed prime ministers, and cabinets were responsible to him —not the Diet (parliament) — as were the military. But his divine, priestly role kept him aloof from political and military decisions and he rarely expressed an opinion to his ministers."

•"Emperor Hirohito made one decision of consequence during the [Pacific] war — the decision to throw in the towel. Above all he sought to preserve the imperial line. The imperial Japanese system of government in which emperors legitimized power exercised by others has been called variously 'government by acquiescence' or a 'system or irresponsibility.' If everyone is responsible for policy then policy formation becomes anonymous so that no one is actually accountable. The primary value emphasized in decision-making was consensus reached through informal procedures."

•"Hirohito's role in operational deliberations and in policy formulation remains controversial, some claiming he rubber-stamped military policy, others that he initiated it. There is no doubt that Hirohito tried to influence policy, but he rarely displayed the type of leadership associated with strong wartime leaders. Rather, he questioned details to indicate his inclinations during the policy process. A lack of information also restricted the emperor. The privy seal and courtiers were well connected and gathered information from a number of sources. But they were few in number compared to the service staffs' and civilian ministries' bureaucracies. Those agencies offered the emperor selective, and sometimes contradictory, data in order to gain imperial support for their programs. Hirohito thus often operated on incomplete or biased information, and sometimes in near isolation. Perhaps a stronger leader could have brought the ministries and staffs into line, but that person would not be Hirohito."

•"Theoretically the Emperor [of Japan] had plenary power; all state decisions needed his sanction. But according to tradition, once the Cabinet and military leaders had agreed on a policy, he could not withhold his approval. He was to remain above politics and transcend party considerations and feuds, for he represented the entire nation. [¶] All these restrictions notwithstanding, [Emperor Hirohito] exercised prodigious influence since he was in the unique position of being able to warn or approve without getting involved. More important, every Japanese was pledged to serve him unto death. This moral power was so potent that he used it sparingly and then only in vague terms. Those reporting to the Throne had to divine his wishes, since he almost always spoke cryptically without expression. [¶] A more positive emperor, like his grandfather, might have consolidated his power; by the Meiji Constitution he was Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. But Hirohito was a studious man who would rather be a scientist than a monarch..."

References

Sources

•Drea, Edward J. (2009). Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-1663-3.

•Dunnigan, James F.; Nofi, Albert A. (1995). Victory at Sea: World War II in the Pacific. New York City, NY: William Morrow & Company, Inc. ISBN 0-688-14947-2.

•Kershaw, Ian (2008). Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World. London, UK: Penguin Group. ISBN 978-0-14-311372-0.

•Lee, Steven Hugh (2015). "The Japanese Empire at War, 1931-1945". In Overy, Richard (ed.). The Oxford Illustrated History of World War II. Oxford University Press. pp. 35–73. ISBN 978-0-19-960582-8.

•Overy, Richard (2010). World War II: The Complete Illustrated History. Carlton Publishing Group. ISBN 978-1-84732-658-4.

•Paine, S.C.M. (2017). The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-01195-3.

•Toland, John (2003) [1970]. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945. Random House Publishing Group.

•Wright, Michael (Ed.) (1989). The World At Arms:The Reader's Digest Illustrated History of World War II. London,UK: The Reader's Digest Association Limited. ISBN 0-89577-333-3.

In this case, it will be better that I separate my answer to both users by different points:

• First of all, my comment was indeed about Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan as a reliable source. Since you have made it clear that you do not question the value of this book as a reliable source, there is no discussion on this first point.
• Second, as I already wrote before that "(...) of course there are many authors who do not believe that he went so far as to be considered the mastermind of the war, beyond being an active participant in it." That is, it is evidently unnecessary to proceed to cite all the authors you can find who maintain that the role of the emperor did not extend to being the mastermind of the war.
• Third, on the other hand, when we talk about the consideration given to a book, not only the reviews in a negative sense should be cited. The positive ones should also be cited. LilAhok cited two of them previously. But others can be cited. In this, Lucian W. Pye states that . Bix's detailed review of the life of Hirohito makes clear that the emperor was not a passive figurehead manipulated by war-minded militarists but an active strategic plotter of the Japanese wars of aggression and a certifiable war criminal. (...) After defeat, he blatantly lied about his wartime actions and assumed the figurehead role that the Allied occupation, fearing that his removal would make the country ungovernable, wanted him to play. Bix relies on an impressive number of memoirs and diaries of high-level Japanese officials, which together present the picture of a complex man trained to be an imperialist, not a rubber stamp for Japan's ambitious militarist. In this, the same Steven Lee you quoted above says about Bix's book that Indeed, Bix demonstrates that Hirohito supported policies that expanded the empire and consolidated an anti-democratic and anti-liberal form of authoritarian regime in Japan. (...) After coming to power in 1926, the Showa emperor embraced kodo or the imperial way, 'a motivating political theology sprung from the idea of the emperor as the literally living embodiment of Japan past and present, a paradigm of moral excellence all should follow' (p 10) as the means of preserving the kokutai Hirohito and his small group of advisers not only shaped, but at times took the lead in influencing and directing, the foreign and domestic polices of the empire. (...) . Bix notes that Hirohito showed some concern about preserving good relations with Britain and America, but that the emperors goal of preserving and strengthening the imperial house led him to continue to support the expansion of Japanese military power into China. In short, Hirohito was not only the symbolic leader of Japan, but also a key actor in the process that led Japan to embrace militarism and a unique brand of corporatist fascism. (...) In the postwar era, the emperor continued to hide his earlier actions from the public and attempted to rebuild elements of the pre-war kokutai. (...) Determined to maintain the Japanese emperor as a figure through whom the United States could influence postwar Japanese society and politics, MacArthur purposefully misrepresented the emperors pre-war activities. Occupation authorities presented the public with the myth that the emperor had nothing to do with the atrocities perpetrated by the empire. In this, Fernando Delage asserts (original in Spanish) that Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan is the most refined interpretation of the events of half a century ago. But in addition to its academic brilliance, it is a work that will help the Japanese to confront their history and to put an end to the burden that has hindered the development of their democracy. The United States will also have to reinterpret its policy of that time, which was aimed at protecting the emperor at all costs. (...) Apoyándose en diarios, cartas y memorias de asesores del emperador y políticos de la época, además de en las investigaciones de una nueva generación de historiadores japoneses, Bix destruye el retrato convencional de Hirohito, al tiempo que pone fin a una discusión de cincuenta años sobre su supuesta irrelevancia política. (...) Bix avoids making any definitive statements and lets the documents speak for themselves, which explains one of the mysteries surrounding the book: why are almost all of his sources Japanese? Why is there no mention of non-Japanese historians who have reached similar conclusions? The author probably wanted his research to be credible to the Japanese; the argument that a foreigner lacks the ability to understand them will no longer be valid. And in this article, retired military historian Tom Mayock asserts that (...) Bix lays out impressive evidence of the Emperor's involvement in events in Manchuria and China. He shows that any disagreement by Hirohito with the policies of expansion was strictly tactical. Although the initial Manchurian aggression was an unauthorized action by the local army, Hirohito specifically authorized subsequent moves. He volunteered advice on military aspects, for he had been given an intensive grounding in military science and took a lively interest in the campaigns. He was extremely well-briefed and no doubt would have learned of the excesses committed during the capture of Nanking. He was probably knowledgeable of the scorching of the Chinese countryside and of biological and chemical warfare initiatives. Unless explained away, this record would have been enough to qualify him, in American eyes, as a war criminal.

Is there any reason to give greater weight to the criticisms of the negative reviews than to the praises of these positive reviews (including the two already provided by LilAhok)? Certainly not. Both views of Professor Bix's book must be considered equally, but treating his criticisms as a mainstream opinion and his defences as a marginal opinion does not seem appropriate or balanced.

• Fourth, if we are going to dedicate ourselves to citing all the authors that come to mind in defense of one side or the other of the debate, this discussion can go on forever, and as a demonstration, I will cite some examples:

A- Kentarō Awaya, in his book Emperor Shōwa's Accountability for War (1991, p. 396) points out that the portrayal of Emperor Shōwa as a constitutional monarch and a pacifist has been widely propagated since the defeat, but it is the greatest political myth of postwar history.

B- Daikichi Irokawa, in The Age of Hirohito (1995, p. 87) wrote that The emperor (...) was actively involved in the crucial affairs of state; he certainly was not the passive constitutional monarch that the official scholars (and Hirohito himself, in postwar years) have so convincingly portrayed.

C- Arne Markland, writes throughout his book Black Ships to Mushroom Clouds: A Story of Japan's Stormy Century 1853-1945 (2015, multiple pages) that Ever since Hirohito's decision in 1935 to prepare for war with China, Konoe increasingly saw a wide wall between his particular concerns and those of the Emperor. (...) But after reinforcements from Kwantung, Korea, and the Home Islands had finally arrived on the scene some two weeks later, Hirohito, perhaps emboldoned by the way he had handled the February mutiny, pressed the Army for a decisive war-ending battle. According to Imperial Order 64 of that year, he commanded the garrison in the area to, as he put it, bring stability to Peking-Tientsin. (...) Japanese historian Atsushi Moriyama has noticed thet following the invasion by Nazi Germany of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, the Japanese chiefs of staff, as well as close advisors of Emperor Hirohito, began to spend more and more time at the Imperial Palace. In the process, Hirohito increasingly compiled and utilized his prerogative as commander-in-chief. A strengthened Liaison Conference, which had been suspended for two and a half years, began to meet refularly, adding the Home Minister and the president of Jpan's Planning Board to its membership. (...) According to historian Akira Fujiwara, the Conference soon eclipsed the Cabinet political significance, usurped the Cabinet's decision-making function, and become Japan's forum for debates and arguments, arguments which were ultimately resolved by Hirohito himself. (...) In the flood of information coming this way, the ever-cautious Emperor searched out contradictions and discrepancies in virtually every report that came across his desk. If Hirohito was not convinced by an argument, he rejected it. (...) The reports Hirohito received were usually timely, detailed, and of good quality; they had to be, for increasingly, as Akira Yamada observes, Hirohito was not only directing grand strategy but was also seeking solutions to mishaps and miscalculations os staff and fiels commanders.

D- Daniel Allen Butler, in Pearl: December 7, 1941 (2020, p.20) states that (...) the emperor was not only aware and informed of Japan's affairs, domestic and international, but took an active, if not always highly visible, part in them. The idea of a "Showa Restoration" - stripping the Diet, prime minister, and Cabinet of any effective power, reducing them to mere functionaries, in the process making the emperor an absolute monarch - reveals the presence of a more forceful personality willing to actually exercise his imperial power than would be expected of a detached, isolated monarch. (...) By the time Hirohito succeeded his father, however, only one of the genro remained alive, with no one of sufficient moral and political stature and prestige to take their places. Hirohito, then, when making imperial decisions, felt far less constrained by temperament or tradition to defer to the counsel of his advisors. Hirohito possessed, by all acounts, a first-class intellect, and as he had subtly demonstrated during the first six years of his reign, then openly displayed, during the February 26 Incident, a will of iron and a measure of ruthless determination. (...) This ruthlessness manifested itself not just in domestic politics but in Japan foreign affairs as well.

E- Axel Berkofsky stressed in this article that The Japanese Emperor held supreme powers with the Japanese people charged with the role of serving and obeying the absolute monarch. The elected Japanese parliament was officially in charge of running Japan's state, but the Emperor had the right to dissolve the parliament any time he affairs wanted.

F- Yuki Tanaka states in his book Entwined Atrocities. New Insights into the U.S.-Japan Alliance (2023, p. xxxvi) that After the war, Hirohito evaded his responsibility, claiming that military leaders acted against his will. Yet, when reading the war records compiled by the Defense Studies Military History Section of the Defense Agency National Institute, evidence can be found that Hirohito was deeply involved in drafting various war policies and making strategies through his "questioning of reports to the throne" and "advice to military leaders." From the records of the wartime diary written by Marquis Kido Kōichi, it can be seen that Hirohito indisputably played the decisive role in making the final decision to enter the war against the Allied nations in December 1941.

G- Marc Ferro, former Director of Studies in Social Sciences at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales, writes in his book Ils étaient sept hommes en guerre (in chapter 2, original in French) that (...) as Pierre-François Souyri suggests, Hirohito, who was very active behind his facade, was pleased to see himself as a shogun riding his white horse, even if after the defeat in 1945 he allowed himself to be relegated by the Americans to his role as civilian emperor. And, in caption on photo pages, he adds Hirohito, Emperor of Japan since 1926. Although secretly, due to the sacred nature of his figure, he is at the centre of the State's decisions, contrary to what foreigners in general, and Americans in particular, believe. By the way, in the bibliography section of his book, Ferro specifically includes 'Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan' among the books that, in his opinion, "constitute an excellent bibliography." One more praising opinion to add to the amount already mentioned.

• Fifth, Minoru Genda describes Japan's state system before and during the war by explaining that (...) "the whole organization was split into three -that is, the Navy, the Army, and what is known as the government- and the only one who could coordinate the three was the emperor." We can find this in Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, by Leon V. Sigal, published by Cornell University Press in 1988, p. 74. Personally, I think this is one of the most accurate descriptions (with the documentation available so far) of Hirohito's role at the time.

For his part, Kōichi Kido, in his diary (p. 218), points out that When the Emperor was not persuaded, the question would be suspended and the decision postponed or the cabinet would reconsider the matter. That was the custom.

• Sixth, obviously, we could go on like this ad infinitum, citing to each other all the authors who defend or denounce Hirohito and his role in the war that we know of or are able to find by searching for bibliographies, but it is equally obvious that this would lead us nowhere. Hirohito is not universally regarded as a highly controversial figure for nothing. For my part, it seems to me that, in 2024, describing Hirohito as "a studious man who would rather be a scientist than a monarch", as Toland did in 1970, is today quite outdated by the documentation that has come to light in the decades following the emperor's death. How many historians today would describe Hirohito in such terms? I suppose very few. As noted in the entry entitled "Response to edit", Peter Wetzler sums up the current state of the debate over Hirohito's role in the war in these terms: "During the Tokyo War Crimes Trials the testimony offered by Tôjô Hideki, and gladly accepted by US officials, succeeded in exonerating the Shôwa Emperor of war guilt. The debate, however, about Hirohito's participation in political and military affairs during the Second World War -whether or not (at first) and to what extent (later)- still continues. It will animate authors for years to come. Now most historians acknowledge that the Emperor was deeply involved, like all nation-state leaders at that time."
• Finally, coming now to the main point of your whole argument, I will distinguish two points:
• 1- One is the section titled Accountability for Japanese war crimes, which contains two subsections: Evidence for wartime culpability and Documents that suggest limited wartime responsibility.

Here, each of these subsections represents one side of the debate over Hirohito's role and responsibility, and it is logical that each one deals with its own. Thus, the subsection Evidence for wartime culpability shows the arguments that point to Hirohito as guilty, including those that consider the arguments of his defenders to be misleading or deceptive, as several critical authors consider. Obviously in subsection Documents that suggest limited wartime responsibility the focus should be on the counterarguments, and if they are not adequately represented at present, then the appropriate thing to do is to add the necessary information about them in that subsection, including arguments that criticize those on the critical side. But, logically, subsectiom Evidence for wartime culpability is the place to present critical arguments, not to confront them with the defender ones, which have their own subsection to be presented, without being possible to contrast in it the critical arguments already presented before.

• 2- As for the rest of the article, I do not think that sufficiently documented facts or conversations pose a problem for anyone, regardless of the reference used to report them. Regarding those facts or statements around which there is controversy, what is appropriate is to add references representing each side of the debate, thus preserving the necessary neutrality, since, as I think this discussion clearly shows, it would not be justified to favor one side over the other. This principle is equally valid for both positions.--Ulises Laertíada (talk) 14:39, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

I just want to note that Emiya's issue is an entirely different one from my own. My concern is with a specific paragraph where Wetzler is being used in juxtaposition with Bix in a way that appears to suggest Wetzler supports Bix's statements about the level of control the Emperor had over the military.

Is there any reason to give greater weight to the criticisms of the negative reviews than to the praises of these positive reviews (including the two already provided by LilAhok)?

No, but I never suggested otherwise. The reviews saying the book is an excellent book, however, do not address or negate the number of other reviews that contend that Bix's theorizing about Hirohito's involvement and the level of control that Bix postulates that Hirohito had is against the grain of what other scholars who assert Hirohito was culpable believe. Which is sort of my entire point. It isn't that Bix's scholarship as a whole is bad, my point is that Bix's claims that Hirohito exercised an extraordinary amount of direct control over the Japanese military isn't a majority view even among the people who hold the opinion that Hirohito is culpable. I am also slightly confused at the comment that I cited Steven Lee when the reviews I cited were by Richard Halloran, Ben-Ami Shillony, Stephen S. Large, and Steven I.Levine? Either way, my point was that Bix's argument that Hirohito had direct control over the military seems to be a minority view even among scholars who find Hirohito culpable. Brocade River Poems (She/They) 00:49, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

Yes, I understand. Don't worry. It's a bit late for my time zone, but I'm thinking about that paragraph to get it to express more accurately the position of the various authors. I hope everything will be correctly expressed soon. As for the mention of Lee, it was from Emiya, and my allusion was directed to this user. I'm sorry for the confusion, but I had to answer both of them in a single reply (which already took me quite a few hours). Sorry again if I caused any confusion.Ulises Laertíada (talk) 01:06, 30 October 2024 (UTC)

Response to edit

I’d like to address an edit made on October 26, 2024, which noted, "This section makes it sound like there's an academic consensus when everything preceding it says there isn't. I do not think a single statement by a historian in a news article about the diary of an aide is enough to verify this statement." [7]

I’m responding here to avoid any edit warring.

One issue with some of the sources listed in Hirohito's wikipedia article is their age; many are from the 1990s and early/late 2000s, which can limit their relevance. The New York Times article from 2018 provides a more recent perspective.

From the NYT article, Jennifer Lind, an associate professor at Dartmouth College and an expert on Japanese war memory, stated, "Over the years, these different pieces of evidence have trickled out and historians have amassed this picture of culpability and how he was reflecting on that. This is another piece of the puzzle that very much confirms that the picture that was taking place before, which is that he was extremely culpable, and after the war he was devastated about this."

Lind stated that the diary referenced in the article is only one of many pieces of evidence historians have used to assess Hirohito's culpability. As the article was published in 2018, her mention of evidence that has "trickled out" encompasses all pertinent findings up to that point. The historians' assessment of Hirohito's culpability in the war is not based solely on a single diary entry.

Considering Lind’s statement that "...historians have amassed this picture of culpability and how he was reflecting on that" into account, Lind’s comment was about the general consensus among historians, rather than just her own perspective. Since the article was published in 2018, it offers a more contemporary view of Hirohito's culpability.

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/24/world/asia/japan-hirohito-war-diary.html

Just wanted to note real quickly that you've forgotten to sign this. That not withstanding, it's well and great for a single historian in an article to state historians have amassed this picture of culpability and the article can certainly state "Historian Jennifer Lind states historians have...", but writing it as a definitive statement in wikivoice would doubtless necessitate scholarly sourcing to demonstrate that the consensus is, in fact, that the majority of historians think this. Again, I am not convinced that a single remark by a single historian in a news piece is substantial enough to verify such an unattributed claim as a fact in Wikivoice, not least of all when a journal article published in 2023 writes the extent of his responsibility in the war has remained intensely debated among predominantly Western scholars [8] as well as this article from 2017 which states Appendix A does not hint, even obliquely, at the on-going scholarly debate over the emperor’s culpability.[9]. That is at least two academic sources that depict the matter of Hirohito's culpability as still being debated, one from 2017 and one from 2023. Hence my point that while Lind's statement is in a reliable source and they are a subject matter expert, making that claim in Wikivoice should probably have higher quality sources to substantiate it.--Brocade River Poems (She/They) 12:10, 26 October 2024 (UTC)

Well, in my opinion, I think it would be good to point out the following:

• First of all, the issue of the extent of Hirohito's responsibility in the war is unquestionably still a matter of debate among historians, and unless a lot of crucial documentation that is not yet available to researchers is declassified, I very much doubt that it can be resolved anytime soon.
• However, some authors point out that in recent years some critical positions have been gaining ground and are now in the majority.
• So, in addition to Jennifer Lind's words, we can cite Peter Wetzler's book Imperial Japan and Defeat in the Second World War: The Collapse of an Empire (2020, p.175) which states that "During the Tokyo War Crimes Trials the testimony offered by Tôjô Hideki, and gladly accepted by US officials, succeeded in exonerating the Shôwa Emperor of war guilt. The debate, however, about Hirohito's participation in political and military affairs during the Second World War -whether or not (at first) and to what extent (later)- still continues. It will animate authors for years to come. Now most historians acknowledge that the Emperor was deeply involved, like all nation-state leaders at that time."

That is, Jennifer Lind stated in 2018 that "Over the years, these different pieces of evidence have trickled out and historians have amassed this picture of culpability and how he was reflecting on that." and Peter Wetzler added in 2020 that "Now most historians acknowledge that the Emperor was deeply involved, like all nation-state leaders at that time."

Also, Wetzler points out that the debate around Hirohito's role evolved from Did Hirohito take part or not in political and military affairs during the war? to To what extent was Hirohito involved in political and military affairs during the war?

In short, regardless of how far Hirohito's involvement in the war went, Lind and Wetzler seem to agree that most historians think he was at least as deeply involved as the other nation-state leaders at the time and he should be considered culpable on these terms.Ulises Laertíada (talk) 20:13, 26 October 2024 (UTC)

That's fair. My point on this subject was that making that claim in Wikivoice should probably have higher quality sources to substantiate it. The addition of the Wetzler 2020 is a good way to solve that. Brocade River Poems (She/They) 00:20, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

Well, we're agree on this point, then.Ulises Laertíada (talk) 09:13, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

In order to address WP:WEIGHT concerns about the article, I thinks it would also be a good idea to reword several sentences in the first and second paragraph of the section entitled "Accountability for Japanese war crimes". By using language like "Historians have said..." and "historians have stated..." without any qualification, the article makes it sounds like there is more of a historical consensus about the level of Hirohito's culpability than there actually is. Emiya1980 (talk) 01:36, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

Regarding this question you bring up, I thought your solution of writing "a significant number of historians..." was quite good. Nonetheless, it seems that other users, like happened with LilAhok, consider that the use of a qualifier such as "a significant number" could be considered as "weasel words", or that the article has already made it sufficiently clear that the question of Hirohito's guilt is a matter of debate, or that the point is the most recent estimates regarding the evolution of the majority opinion on this issue.

Well, related to this, we have the quoted statements from Jennifer Lind and Peter Wetzler that I highlighted in my message of 26 October. On the other hand, and with the above being true, it cannot be ignored that this topic continues to be the subject of intense debate among experts, as Wetzler's paragraph also reminds us.

So perhaps the best thing to do would be to use a purely quantifying formula (without entering into qualifications), such as "many historians have stated..." The word "many" does not qualify, it only quantifies (although it does not specify the exact number, which in any case would vary over the years), so it cannot be considered as a use of "weasel words" and it would express the real situation quite well. What do you think?Ulises Laertíada (talk) 13:30, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

I agree. "Many historians" would sound better.Emiya1980 (talk) 17:21, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

I would concur, if we attribute it as a statement that Wetzler has made MOS:WEASEL doesn't apply. Brocade River Poems (She/They) 17:56, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

As mentioned above "Wetzler points out that the debate around Hirohito's role evolved from Did Hirohito take part or not in political and military affairs during the war? to To what extent was Hirohito involved in political and military affairs during the war?"

In other words, the question has transitioned from asking if he was involved to exploring how involved he actually was. I think this information should be clearly presented in the article. In the article, the statement "The issue of Emperor Hirohito's war responsibility is contested" feels too vague and potentially misleading, as it suggests that the possibility of his non-involvement exists.

WP:RSUW - I understand that the topic is under debate but how much attention should we give to minority views that he was not culpable? If the viewpoint that he is not that culpable is held by a significant minority, then "most historians" or "the majority of historians" would be more appropriate, as that is that language used by Wetzler, which implies significantly more than half (majority), not just a large number of them. LilAhok (talk) 19:55, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

Having read all the replies, I agree with what LilAhok says. I want to clarify that, of course, any claim that Wetzler could have made MOS:WEASEL doesn't apply. Wetzler is an expert on the subject, and his statement is also in line with other recent statements by experts such as Jennifer Lind.

I think I should clarify what the allusion to the "weasel words" was referring to. The allusion to the "weasel words" was in reference to the discussion about the expression "a significant number of historians." Of course, one can always wonder what exactly is meant by "significant," or at what point a number of historians on this subject is considered to begin to be "significant". This has nothing to do with Wetzler's reference.

Wetzler states two things in the paragraph referred to that are perfectly compatible with each other:

• 1- "The debate (...) about Hirohito's participation in political and military affairs during the Second World War -whether or not (at first) and to what extent (later)- still continues. It will animate authors for years to come.
• 2- "Now most historians acknowledge that the Emperor was deeply involved, like all nation-state leaders at that time."

That is, it was formerly debated whether or not Hirohito had participated in political and military affairs during World War II, and later that debate evolved into a debate about how far Hirohito's involvement in such affairs went (because the fact of his involvement is already a generally accepted point today).

So, if the use of "many historians" may need clarification, as BrocadeRiverPoems says, or may be imprecise, as LilAhok says, then I agree with the latter that it would be better, for both reasons, to use "most historians", as Wetzler states it.

What alternative do you think is more appropriate?Ulises Laertíada (talk) 20:46, 31 October 2024 (UTC)

While I don't believe any historian currently doubts that Emperor Hirohito bears some culpability for Japan's wartime actions, I don't think there is a historical consensus that he was "directly responsible" let alone that he "worked through intermediaries to exercise a great deal of control over the military" as Bix and some other historians suggest. It is true there are many historians who make strong arguments in favor of Hirohito being a leading participant in Japanese war crimes. However, there are at least just as many historians who argue the sheer amount of restrictions imposed on him by the kokutai limited him to being (at most) just one player among many involved in the Japanese elite's collective decision-making. Therefore, I disagree with having the article read "most historians" in this context.

With regards to concerns about the use of "weasel words", Wikipedia's guidelines regarding language that normally qualifies as such are significantly more flexible than comments in this thread seem to suggest. According to MOS:WEASEL, the examples listed therein "are not automatically weasel words...[and] may also be used in the lead section of an article or in a topic sentence of a paragraph,...[if] the article body or the rest of the paragraph can supply attribution." Consequently, since the claims set forth within the sentences in question are subsequently attributed to specific historians later on in the article, using language like "many historians" or even "a significant number of historians" shouldn't violate Wikipedia's policy re: weasel words so long as such sentences are placed at the beginning of a paragraph. Emiya1980 (talk) 03:56, 1 November 2024 (UTC)

It is, I maintain, a problem easily solved by simply writing According to historian Peter Wetzler, most historians...

We're using Wetzler to substantiate the claim, and if it is attributed to Wetzler and cited then there's no real concern about the statement being contested. Brocade River Poems (She/They) 06:53, 1 November 2024 (UTC)

Having the article read "According to historian Peter Wetzler... before claiming "most historians say..." is an acceptable compromise. Emiya1980 (talk) 07:42, 1 November 2024 (UTC)

Okay, so I understand that we have reached a consensus to use the formula "According to historian Peter Wetzler, most historians...". If no one else objects today, I think it can be written like that.Ulises Laertíada (talk) 09:34, 1 November 2024 (UTC)

WP:INTEXT -according to guidelines, attribution is appropriate when "It may also be used when loosely summarizing a source's position in your own words, and it should always be used for biased statements of opinion."

If wetzler's statement about his culpability is an argument, and not fact, then attribution would be appropriate, otherwise attribution is not appropriate. LilAhok (talk) 14:40, 1 November 2024 (UTC)

Clearly, Wetzler argues that most historians now agree that Hirohito was as deeply involved in his country's political and military affairs during the war as any other nation-state leader of the time. In other words, he is stating the majority opinion that he observes among contemporary scholars. So, what formula do you all think is the most appropriate? Is a consensus possible? If there is no consensus, then the right thing to do is to leave it as it is now.Ulises Laertíada (talk) 15:35, 1 November 2024 (UTC)

If no consensus can be found, it is probably best to take this discussion to the Dispute resolution noticeboard. Emiya1980 (talk) 19:45, 1 November 2024 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 5 November 2024

In the section Legacy and honors, the second quote from Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi is incorrectly transcribed here as, "Hirohito would be no more have granted independence Korea independence or returned Manchuria to China..." The first mention of "independence" is incorrect; the source is instead, "Hirohito would be no more have granted Korea independence or returned Manchuria to China...". Please remove that incorrect first mention of "independence". 101.53.216.4 (talk) 11:20, 5 November 2024 (UTC)

Actually, there is a second mistake in the transcription of that quote, the word, "be" should also be removed, leaving it as "Hirohito would no more have granted Korea independence or returned Manchuria to China...". 101.53.216.4 (talk) 12:20, 5 November 2024 (UTC)

 Done. Ulises Laertíada (talk) 12:52, 5 November 2024 (UTC)